Preventing Coups d’état

Erica De Bruin

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2018, vol. 62, issue 7, 1433-1458

Abstract: Although coups remain a pressing concern for rulers across the globe, the mechanisms through which common coup-prevention strategies operate have not been well theorized or rigorously tested. This article analyzes how “counterbalancing†the military with other security forces prevents coups. Using new cross-national time-series data on state security forces along with evidence from sixteen case studies, the article demonstrates that counterbalancing reduces the likelihood that coup attempts will succeed and that it does so primarily by creating incentives for some soldiers to resist the coup, rather than by creating barriers to coordination between forces. However, counterbalancing is not associated with fewer coup attempts. In fact, the creation of a new security force increases the odds of a coup attempt in the following year. These findings highlight potential costs associated with counterbalancing and explain why it is not more widespread.

Keywords: coup d’état; coup-proofing; counterbalancing; security forces; civil–military relations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:62:y:2018:i:7:p:1433-1458

DOI: 10.1177/0022002717692652

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