Please Help Us (or Don’t): External Interventions and Negotiated Settlements in Civil Conflicts

Heather Elko McKibben and Amy Skoll

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2021, vol. 65, issue 2-3, 480-505

Abstract: How do different types of external intervention affect the likelihood of a negotiated settlement in civil conflicts? Drawing on the negotiation literature, which shows that the nature of the parties’ “best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)†influences the bargaining process between them, we argue different types of intervention affect governments’ and rebel groups’ BATNAs in different ways. This, in turn, affects the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. To test this argument, we address the fact that interventions are nonrandom, and that characteristics of civil conflicts that lead to different types of intervention also influence the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. We therefore use a two-stage statistical model. The first stage predicts the likelihood of different types of intervention, and drawing on those results, the second stage analyzes the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. The results provide insights into how different types of intervention affect civil conflict outcomes.

Keywords: civil wars; conflict resolution; negotiation; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:65:y:2021:i:2-3:p:480-505

DOI: 10.1177/0022002720950417

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