EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

I’ll Be Back? Exiled Leaders and Political Instability

Daniel Krcmaric and Abel Escribà -Folch

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2023, vol. 67, issue 2-3, 402-427

Abstract: Exile is often considered a useful political solution that can coax violent or unpopular leaders out of power. But these “golden parachutes†may come with a price. Specifically, do exiled leaders increase instability back in their home countries? In this paper, we outline the mechanisms through which exiled rulers can destabilize their home state’s politics and ultimately increase conflict. We present two types of evidence to support the argument. The first is a cross-national analysis that uses our original Leaders in Exile dataset to examine how exiled leaders shape the likelihood of civil conflicts, coups, and protests. The second is a cross-leader analysis designed to minimize inferential concerns by comparing cases where leaders escape into exile with cases where leaders are killed. In both tests, we find that exiled leaders are linked to political instability in their home countries.

Keywords: political leadership; exile; civil wars; conflict; international security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00220027221115622 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:67:y:2023:i:2-3:p:402-427

DOI: 10.1177/00220027221115622

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:67:y:2023:i:2-3:p:402-427