Your Reputation Precedes You: Ceasefires and Cooperative Credibility During Civil Conflict

Corinne Bara and Govinda Clayton

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2023, vol. 67, issue 7-8, 1325-1349

Abstract: How does the state’s behavior in negotiations with one non-state group influence the behavior of other non-state actors? We argue that the dynamics of different conflicts within the same country are interdependent, and that a state develops a reputation through its interactions with each conflict party. This reputation provides a valuable source of information that other groups use to judge the state’s cooperative intentions. When a state develops a reputation for cooperation, this increases the likelihood of (indirect) reciprocation from other groups. More specifically, we argue that when states enter into (and honor) a ceasefire with one rebel group, they demonstrate a credible reputation for cooperation. A credible reputation for cooperation, we posit, increases the likelihood that other conflict parties enter into ceasefires with the state, or that they de-escalate their military activities. We test our claims using the new civil conflict ceasefire dataset and find support for our argument.

Keywords: reputation; ceasefires; civil war; bargaining; conflict dynamics; conflict management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:67:y:2023:i:7-8:p:1325-1349

DOI: 10.1177/00220027221126725

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