Just Patronage? Familiarity and the Diplomatic Value of Non-Career Ambassadors

Michael A. Goldfien

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2024, vol. 68, issue 7-8, 1417-1442

Abstract: Career diplomats have expertise. Why, then, do U.S. presidents appoint relative novices to key diplomatic posts? Conventional wisdom points to patronage. Yet this explanation overlooks the benefits of a diplomat’s familiarity with political superiors. Inherent in delegated diplomacy is uncertainty over diplomats' ability to “deliver†on understandings reached at the negotiating table. Non-career diplomats often speak more credibly for political superiors, creating an incentive for foreign counterparts to engage in diplomacy. I theorize a tradeoff between familiarity and expertise to generate empirically testable prediction. Counterintuitively, I expect that presidents often sacrifice professional expertise to delegate important diplomatic assignments to relative amateurs, even accounting for the patronage value of the post. I find empirical support for the argument using a novel dataset on U.S. ambassadorial appointments from the Reagan through Trump administrations.

Keywords: ambassadors; delegation; diplomacy; foreign policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:68:y:2024:i:7-8:p:1417-1442

DOI: 10.1177/00220027231198518

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