Backgrounds With Benefits? Rebel Group Origins and Concessions During Civil Wars in Africa

Jessica Maves Braithwaite and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2024, vol. 68, issue 9, 1691-1716

Abstract: Why do governments make concessions to some rebels but not others? We argue that the origins of rebel groups influence the bargaining process, and the government’s willingness to make concessions in particular. Rebel groups inherit different resource endowments – community ties and military expertise – from pre-existing “parent†organizations. These resource endowments are visible to the government, and they provide critical information about the likely durability of the rebellion. We expect that rebel group origins facilitating these endowments are associated with the state offering concessions earlier in the conflict. Employing original data on rebel group origins, as well as information on government concessions during post-Cold War African conflicts, we find general support for our expectations, although not all types of parent organizations are equally beneficial to rebel groups when it comes to extracting concessions from the state.

Keywords: civil wars; rebellion; internal armed conflict; bargaining; negotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:68:y:2024:i:9:p:1691-1716

DOI: 10.1177/00220027231211792

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