Do States Constrain Non-State Hackers? International Telecommunication Union Elections and Non-State Cyber Aggression

Conner B. Joyce

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2025, vol. 69, issue 10, 1687-1712

Abstract: Do states constrain non-state hackers? This article extends research on the role of transnational cyber aggression in international relations, showing that governments can be incentivized to mitigate non-state hacking. To test this argument, I leverage competitive elections to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which requires states to campaign on their cybersecurity record. By exploiting this variation, I demonstrate that states are responsive to incentives. Candidates reduce non-state cyber aggression to increase their likelihood of election. This finding demonstrates the potential utility of international institutions as a policy solution to transnational hacking, suggesting that structural incentives can induce states to constrain hackers operating in their territory.

Keywords: hacking; cooperation; cybersecurity; international agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:69:y:2025:i:10:p:1687-1712

DOI: 10.1177/00220027251323557

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