Diplomatic Statements and the Strategic Use of Terrorism in Civil Wars

Gabriella Levy, Rebecca Dudley, Chong Chen and David A. Siegel

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2025, vol. 69, issue 2-3, 296-320

Abstract: How does third-party diplomatic and material support affect rebel groups’ use of terrorism in civil wars? We argue via a game-theoretic model that diplomatic support prompts prospective shifts in rebel tactics, from civilian to military targets, in anticipation of material support, while material support alters the cost structure of attacks, leading to the same tactical shift. We empirically test the model’s implications using an original dataset of UN resolutions about countries in civil wars as well as a case study of South Africa. In support of our theory, we find that both diplomatic resolutions and material interventions in favor of the rebels are associated with rebel tactical shifts, leading to decreased reliance on violence against civilians. These findings demonstrate the value of modeling civilian and military targeting as substitutes rather than examining civilian targeting in isolation.

Keywords: diplomatic statement; civil war; terrorism; civilian targeting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:69:y:2025:i:2-3:p:296-320

DOI: 10.1177/00220027241227907

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