Do Teams Always Lose to Win? Performance Incentives and the Player Draft in the Australian Football League

Jeff Borland, Mark Chicu and Robert Macdonald
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Mark Chicu: Northwestern University

Journal of Sports Economics, 2009, vol. 10, issue 5, 451-484

Abstract: This article examines whether the player draft used since 1986 in the Australian Football League has caused clubs to tank; that is, to seek to lose matches to obtain improved draft choices. A comparison of clubs’ performances in regular season matches played before and after introduction of the draft provides no evidence that clubs have engaged in tanking. The main potential explanations for the absence of tanking in the Australian Football League are the relatively low benefits to clubs from tanking and limited opportunities for them to engage in this behavior.

Keywords: player draft; incentives; Australian Football League (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:10:y:2009:i:5:p:451-484

DOI: 10.1177/1527002509331615

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