May Increasing Doping Sanctions Discourage Entry to the Competition?

David Hirschmann

Journal of Sports Economics, 2017, vol. 18, issue 7, 720-736

Abstract: This article shows that under certain circumstances, an increase in doping sanctions can decrease the number of participants in the competition. The model, which is based on a work of Haugen, is formulated as a two-stage game in which agents first decide whether to participate in a competition and second whether to use an illicit but effective drug when competing. If initially low sanctions are increased but do not prevent a certain overall level of doping, then the payoff for all athletes is reduced, which, in turn, reduces their willingness to participate in the competition.

Keywords: doping; entry barrier; game theory; prisoner’s dilemma; chicken game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:18:y:2017:i:7:p:720-736

DOI: 10.1177/1527002515595265

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