The Role of Ex Post Audits in Doping Enforcement

Andreas Goetsch and Christian Salzmann

Journal of Sports Economics, 2018, vol. 19, issue 7, 960-976

Abstract: We develop a theoretical model of ex post doping audits and analyze their effects on an athlete’s doping decision. In our model, the doping agency can store doping samples and retest them at a later point. We show that there is a doping minimizing storage and retesting mix for the doping agency and that storing doping samples will reduce the athletes’ doping intensity. Furthermore, there is a threshold for the agency’s antidoping budget. If the budget exceeds this threshold, inefficiencies in the antidoping battle will occur and, depending on the agency’s objective, the athletes’ doping incentives may even increase.

Keywords: doping; time effects; ex post audits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1527002517696959 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:19:y:2018:i:7:p:960-976

DOI: 10.1177/1527002517696959

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Sports Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().