Equal Revenue Sharing and the Optimal Distribution of Talent in the N-Team Leagues

Masaki Fujimoto

Journal of Sports Economics, 2020, vol. 21, issue 2, 103-114

Abstract: This article shows that if a certain symmetric property of contests is assumed, then the ratio of equilibrium talent levels under equal revenue sharing maximizes the total league revenue and profits in the n -team model. This result holds irrespective of the types of conjectural variations, “Walrasian†or “Nash.â€

Keywords: sports leagues; contest success function; equal revenue sharing; the optimal distribution of talent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1527002519867368 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:21:y:2020:i:2:p:103-114

DOI: 10.1177/1527002519867368

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Sports Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().