The Undesirable Consequences of Doping Regulations: Why Stricter Efforts Might Strengthen Doping Incentives

Kasim Music

Journal of Sports Economics, 2020, vol. 21, issue 3, 281-303

Abstract: We analyze the impact of doping regulations on the doping decisions of athletes in a Tullock contest. We show that stricter anti-doping regulations may increase the profits of doped athletes, which makes doping more sustainable in the long run. Under certain conditions, a naturally more able athlete may receive a lower payoff than his naturally less able competitor, reversing the natural payoff order. We consider the case of different anti-doping agencies and show that harmonization of doping regulations may increase the doping intensity. We point out incentive problems that may arise in the case of strategic interaction between anti-doping agencies.

Keywords: doping; regulation; Tullock contest; prisoner’s dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:21:y:2020:i:3:p:281-303

DOI: 10.1177/1527002519885425

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