Wages, Talent, and Demand for NCAA Sport After the Alston v. NCAA Antitrust Case

Shane D. Sanders

Journal of Sports Economics, 2024, vol. 25, issue 2, 169-185

Abstract: From the “landmark†Alston v. NCAA antitrust decision, we examine whether the legally hypothesized fan wage-repugnance effect implies procompetitive benefits in NCAA sports output markets via increased output demand from student-athlete wage restriction. In Alston v. NCAA , the Courts took this benefit as given but failed to recognize the empirically-verified relationship between league talent and fan demand. We assume a legally-hypothesized wage-repugnance line exists and present a theoretical output-demand model functionally dependent upon allocations in a wage-constrained labor-input market. Even given fan repugnance, wage restrictions do not necessarily generate procompetitive benefits. For families of model parameterizations, wage restrictions impose anticompetitive harm.

Keywords: sport antitrust case; amateur sports demand; antitrust laws; NCAA student-athlete pay; Alston v. NCAA (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:25:y:2024:i:2:p:169-185

DOI: 10.1177/15270025231217970

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