The Optimal Number of Firms With an Application to Professional Sports Leagues

Sanghoo Bae and Jay Pil Choi
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Sanghoo Bae: Clark University
Jay Pil Choi: Michigan State University

Journal of Sports Economics, 2007, vol. 8, issue 1, 99-108

Abstract: This article analyzes a cartel’s optimal choice of the number of firms in Salop’s circular city model under different assumptions about cooperative behaviors among firms. The authors consider two scenarios: (a) a cartel operates under a fully collusive regime in which it controls the number of firms and their pricing, and (b) a cartel operates under a semi-collusive regime in which it controls only the number of firms and pricing is left to individual firms. The authors compare the outcomes in both scenarios to the socially optimal and free entry outcomes. They then apply these comparisons to the case of a professional sports league’s optimal choice of the number of franchises.

Keywords: professional sports leagues; circular city (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:8:y:2007:i:1:p:99-108

DOI: 10.1177/1527002505279764

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