The Choices Judges Make

Martin van Hees and Bernard Steunenberg

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2000, vol. 12, issue 3, 305-323

Abstract: In this paper we focus on the way in which courts affect public policy. We present a model of judicial behavior that combines insights from theories emphasizing the importance of policy preferences with those suggesting that courts are only motivated by formal-legal criteria. By embedding our model of judicial choice in a broader context of political decision-making we show how judges are able to affect policy and under what circumstances the judiciary will change their legal interpretations. The model is applied to decision-making by the Dutch Supreme Court on euthanasia to illustrate its main features.

Keywords: court decision making; euthanasia; game theory; judicial behavior; public policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:12:y:2000:i:3:p:305-323

DOI: 10.1177/0951692800012003003

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