The Paradox of Integration in Intra-State Conflicts

Axel Hadenius and Lauri Karvonen

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2001, vol. 13, issue 1, 35-51

Abstract: This article examines a seeming paradox in conflict theory. Integration and interdependence between groups is frequently seen as a conflict-preventing mechanism, and ample empirical evidence can be found in support of this view. All the same, it is apparent that conflicts do occasionally break out between interdependent groups and tend to be much more devastating than other conflicts; civil wars offer ample and tragic empirical illustrations. The authors argue that a security dilemma becomes acute in the relations between interdependent groups once the risk of a manifest conflict is there. It becomes imperative to try to strike first because the mutual vulnerability of the groups is so high. In connection with Lijphart's idea of consociationalism, the authors suggest that elite cooperation and power-sharing constitute potential ways out of the security dilemma. The creation of mutually credible, neutral institutions is the key to a lasting settlement of intra-state conflicts.

Keywords: conflict management; ethnic conflicts; institutional context; intra-state conflict; security dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:13:y:2001:i:1:p:35-51

DOI: 10.1177/0951692801013001002

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