Coercion, Corruption, and Reform: State and Society in the Soviet-Type Socialist Regime

Antoni Z. Kaminski

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1989, vol. 1, issue 1, 77-102

Abstract: This paper offers an institutional and evolutionary interpretation of the Soviet-type state. Coercion, corruption and reform are treated as three distinct principles organizing the system of rule and the developmental potential of the state. The strong reliance on coercion characteristic of Stalin's period gave way to the corruption of the society by the elites, and vice versa. This mutual adjustment between the ruling classes and the society is one of the reasons for the declining efficiency of the Soviet-type regimes, particularly in the economic domain. The solution to this is the market reform and political changes that are necessary to make it work. The reform problem is examined from two perspectives: (1) the Soviet world system; (2) internal factors that help or block the reform efforts. The general theoretical analysis is illustrated with a discussion of the Hungarian, Polish and Czechoslovak cases.

Keywords: institutional change; Eastern European politics; dependency; state-society relationships; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:77-102

DOI: 10.1177/0951692889001001006

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