Explaining the 1914 War in Europe

Frank C. Zagare
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Frank C. Zagare: Department of Political Science, University at Buffalo, SUNY, 520 Park Hall, Buffalo, NY 14260, USA, fczagare@buffalo.edu

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2009, vol. 21, issue 1, 63-95

Abstract: This essay constructs a theoretically rigorous explanation of the 1914 European war that involved Austria—Hungary, Germany, Russia, and France. It also serves to confirm Trachtenberg's contention that `one does not have to take a particularly dark view of German intentions' to explain the onset of war in 1914 and `question the ``inadvertent war'' theory'. A number of related questions about the Great War are also addressed within the context of a generic game-theoretic escalation model with incomplete information. The analysis suggests that general war broke out in Europe in 1914 because both Austria— Hungary and Germany believed that, when push came to shove, Russia would stand aside if Austria moved aggressively against Serbia. There is a sense in which the war can be said to be unintended but there is no sense in which it should be understood as accidental.

Keywords: analytic narrative; escalation; game theory; July crisis; World War I (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:21:y:2009:i:1:p:63-95

DOI: 10.1177/0951629808097284

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