The Puzzle of Weak Pocketbook Voting

Robert Grafstein
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Robert Grafstein: Department of Political Science, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602, USA, bobgraf@uga.edu

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2009, vol. 21, issue 4, 451-482

Abstract: This article investigates why predominantly self-interested voters exhibit weak pocketbook voting. Focusing on the USA, it estimates partisan government’s impact on household income and, based on the Permanent Income Hypothesis, models the conversion of that income into consumption, the source of voters’ utility in the model. The analysis implies that pocketbook voting is weak because anticipated policy is already incorporated in household consumption plans. Sociotropic variables are more powerful because they determine the relative value of partisan policies in the longer term. Using PSID data, estimates of the US parties’ impact on income generate a measure of partisan utility differences. This measure enters into a probit analysis using 1952—2000 ANES presidential election data. The pocketbook measure performs as predicted both independently and in relation to sociotropic variables.

Keywords: Permanent Income Hypothesis; pocketbook voting; sociotropic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:21:y:2009:i:4:p:451-482

DOI: 10.1177/0951629809339829

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