Power Sharing and Reform Capacity

Johannes Lindvall
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Johannes Lindvall: Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Manor Road, Oxford OX1 3UQ, UK, johannes.lindvall@politics.ox.ac.uk

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2010, vol. 22, issue 3, 359-376

Abstract: In this paper I argue that reform capacity, defined as the extent to which political institutions facilitate the adoption of socially efficient reforms, is not primarily determined by the number of veto players in the political system, but by the availability of institutional mechanisms that allow political agents to solve commitment problems associated with bargaining over reform. Specifically, I argue that power sharing is compatible with high reform capacity if policy areas involved in package deals are all controlled by the central government (or whatever level of government makes the reform), and if the ‘losers’ are confident that they will remain veto players in the future.

Keywords: institutions; reform; veto players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:22:y:2010:i:3:p:359-376

DOI: 10.1177/0951629810369524

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