An institutional remedy for ethnic patronage politics

T Clark Durant and Michael Weintraub
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T Clark Durant: McKinsey & Company
Michael Weintraub: Georgetown University

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2014, vol. 26, issue 1, 59-78

Abstract: When the difference between winning and losing elections is large, elites have incentives to use ethnicity to control access to spoils, mobilizing some citizens and excluding others. This paper presents a new electoral mechanism, the turn-taking institution, that could move states away from ethnically mediated patron–client politics. With this mechanism, the whole executive term goes to a sufficiently inclusive supermajority coalition; if no coalition qualifies, major coalitions take short, alternating turns several times before the next election. A decision-theoretic model shows how the turn-taking institution would make it easier for mass-level actors to coordinate on socially productive policy and policy-making processes. We argue this institution would raise the price elites would pay to deploy and enforce exclusive ethnic markers.

Keywords: divided societies; ethnicity; institutional design; patronage; turn-taking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:26:y:2014:i:1:p:59-78

DOI: 10.1177/0951629813488986

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