Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Cycle? Evidence from 36 Elections

Scott L. Feld and Bernard Grofman

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1992, vol. 4, issue 2, 231-237

Abstract: We analyze 36 elections held by professional associations, unions, and non-profit organizations in England and Ireland. We show that these elections manifest a remarkably high degree of transitivity, with a Condorcet (majority) winner always found. Moreover, ordering alternatives according to their Borda score provides a transitive majority ordering in nearly all instances.

Keywords: cycle; majority rule; public choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:4:y:1992:i:2:p:231-237

DOI: 10.1177/0951692892004002007

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