Penalty and Crime: Further Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence

George Tsebelis

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1993, vol. 5, issue 3, 349-374

Abstract: Two different models of the game between police and public, one with two-sided incomplete information and the other with multiple strategies, lead to the same results as my previous research: changes in penalties at equilibrium do not affect crime but instead affect police behavior. I compare these models with alternative models of the police-public game which come to different conclusions. I provide reasons for the differences in the conclusions, as well as empirical evidence against which the different models can be evaluated.

Keywords: crime; game theory; penalty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:349-374

DOI: 10.1177/0951692893005003003

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