Competition, Multiple Objectives and Imprecision

Gregory S. Sanjian

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1994, vol. 6, issue 1, 75-104

Abstract: This paper develops a fuzzy multi-criteria game model of the competition between two arms exporting countries. The model permits multiple goals for the participants and anticipates a sizable degree of decision-making imprecision. The imprecision in the process is portrayed by fuzzy sets, the multiple goals of the exporters are incorporated through the principles of multi-criteria analysis, and the two-party competition is modeled by game theory. A method for deriving the exporters' equilibrium arms transfer strategies is presented in the paper. An equilibrium strategy for a particular exporter is a function of that exporter's fuzzy calculations on the potential effectiveness of certain combinations of strategies (the exporter's and its adversary's) for accomplishing its goals, on the likelihood that its rival will select a certain strategy, and on the importance of the goals to the exporter. The paper also illustrates the model by using it to identify the equilibrium arms trade strategies of the US for Israel and the USSR for Egypt in 1967.

Keywords: arms transfers; fuzzy sets; game theory; multi-criteria analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:6:y:1994:i:1:p:75-104

DOI: 10.1177/0951692894006001004

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