Stability and Deterrence Through Strategic Nuclear Arms

Horst Afheldt and Philipp Sonntag
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Horst Afheldt: Max Planck Institut, Starnberg
Philipp Sonntag: Max Planck Institut, Starnberg

Journal of Peace Research, 1973, vol. 10, issue 3, 245-250

Abstract: A quantitative simulation is carried out in order to test the political outcome of ABM and MIRVs. Technical variables serve as input: number of ICBMs, of ABMs, hit probabilities, etc. Strategic positions result as output: mutual second strike capability, effective defense of one power only, etc. The conclusion is that MIRVs, especially in com bination with ABMs, represent an extreme threat to equilibrium.

Date: 1973
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:joupea:v:10:y:1973:i:3:p:245-250

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