The Functions of SALT

Sverre Lodgaard
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Sverre Lodgaard: International Peace Research Institute, Oslo Institute of Political Science, University of Oslo

Journal of Peace Research, 1977, vol. 14, issue 1, 1-22

Abstract: Drawing on evidence produced during the 7 years of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), we here try to summarize the main effects of the talks concerning: arms build-up, strategic stability, crisis stability, detente, the focus of superpower relations, legitimation of the arms race, strategic supremacy vis-à -vis the rest of the world, and international status quo.The strategic relationship seems plagued by growing uncertainty and instability because of surging R&D efforts. Improved capabilities and doctrines for nuclear warfighting open up prospects for dangerous adventures in times of crises. Detente and peaceful cooperation to some extent have had to yield to intensified nuclear rearmament. In this paper, we try to outline the role of SALT in bringing about these trends, which clearly make strategic arms limitation more difficult. To the extent that it has contributed to them, SALT has sown the seeds of its own deadlock.This is not to say that SALT has come to an end. The superpowers probably see a long- term benefit from talking to each other to promote common interests under shifting circum stances, such as the preservation of strategic supremacy over the rest of the world and main tenance and maximization of influence and control in the face of third party challengers. There can be an element of harmony in the confrontation and competition between them. Permanent talks make it easier to take care of common interests in unspectacular ways than do ad hoc contacts — especially if the interests are largely considered illegitimate by the rest of the international community.

Date: 1977
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