Structural-Dynamic Arms Control

Gernot Köhler
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Gernot Köhler: Center of International Studies, Princeton University and Canadian Peace Research Institute

Journal of Peace Research, 1977, vol. 14, issue 4, 315-326

Abstract: The investigation starts from the observation that, in the field of arms control, failure seems to be the rule and points out that this may be due to an empirically observable close relation ship between long-term military and economic growth. Possible causal relationships between those two kinds of growth are discussed and a causal hypothesis is suggested which explains long-term military growth in terms of a social-psychological pusheffect (the Vebleneffect) in combination with an economic restrainteffect. On that theoretical basis, two approaches to arms control are proposed — namely, arms control through manipulation of the Vebleneffect and arms control through limits to economic growth. These two methods approach arms control from a global perspective, which transcends the perspectives of both intra-national antimilitarism and inter-national arms control diplomacy.

Date: 1977
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:joupea:v:14:y:1977:i:4:p:315-326

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