Détente: Models and Strategies

Peter Schlotter
Additional contact information
Peter Schlotter: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, FRG

Journal of Peace Research, 1983, vol. 20, issue 3, 213-220

Abstract: Increasing tensions in NATO over détente demonstrate that the Harmel formula 'Defense and Détente' has become controversial. Europeans think about the 'Europeanization of Europe' and a strengthening of the 'European identity' vis-à -vis the superpowers.Here a détente model is outlined which is based on European interests. Scientific conceptions of the fifties and sixties are recalled which have widely fallen into oblivion. The model consists of the following elements: (1) a pluralistic security system, defined by the compatibility of central values, the consideration of the interests of the other side, and the anticipation of the reactions of all the partners (based on K.W. Deutsch, whose model of a developing Atlantic Community is transferred to the European East-West conflict); (2) functionalism according to which cooperation in as many areas as possible plays a tension- reducing role; (3) consociational systems which settle conflicts in their internal relations with a minimum of force and are stable even though they are very fractionated culturahy, according to living standards, ethnic groups, and basic ideological positions or religion. Consociational systems normally have broad coalition governments, mutual vetoes of important interest, ethnic, or religious groups, the principle of proportional representation, and the autonomy and self-management of each group. The basic pattern of conflict resolution is 'package dealing'.The model is illustrated by examples which demonstrate an embryonic European East-West security system. The article ends with — still abstract — recommendations for a new structure of détente policy, e.g. defensive policy, functionalist approach, multilateralization, dispersion of bi-polarism, and conflict resolution by package deals.

Date: 1983
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/20/3/213.abstract (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:joupea:v:20:y:1983:i:3:p:213-220

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Peace Research from Peace Research Institute Oslo
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().