OPEC and the Problem of Collective Action

Raino Malnes
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Raino Malnes: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Oslo

Journal of Peace Research, 1983, vol. 20, issue 4, 343-355

Abstract: The article considers the success of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in con trolling the price of crude oil as a possible example that the destructive logic of collective action may be circumvented. It is argued that the OPEC countries have succeeded in the pursuit of their collective cause due to the ability and willingness of Saudi Arabia to make good the damage perpetrated by free-rider conduct. Yet, the recent (March 1982 — March 1983) conflict over pricing- and production policy was a war of nerves, from which an accord emerged only after a painful game of threats and brinkmanship.

Date: 1983
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:joupea:v:20:y:1983:i:4:p:343-355

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