Camp David: Problem-Solving or Power Politics as Usual?

Tom Princen
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Tom Princen: Center of International Studies, Princeton University

Journal of Peace Research, 1991, vol. 28, issue 1, 57-69

Abstract: To what extent can powerful mediators perform a facilitating function in their interventions and to what extent are they limited to striking separate deals with the protagonists? Put differently, can a powerful mediator only aim its intervention at payoff structures or can it attempt to influence the very nature of the parties' interactions? This article addresses these questions by analyzing one mediator's practice - President Jimmy Carter's efforts at Camp David - and his impact on the disputing parties. The article first examines the parties' contrasting views of the nature of the mediator's role and shows how this led not only to misunderstanding and frustration but also to missed opportunities. Next, the article argues that as much as Carter wanted to capture the advantages of a `facilitator', in the end, he was constrained by his position as President of the United States to play `power politics' as usual. The article concludes that his structural position, more than anything, accounts for the eventual peace treaty.

Date: 1991
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:joupea:v:28:y:1991:i:1:p:57-69

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