Pure Coercion vs. Carrot-and-Stick Offers in Crisis Bargaining

Steven Greffenius and Jungil Gill
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Steven Greffenius: The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies, Nanjing, China
Jungil Gill: Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin

Journal of Peace Research, 1992, vol. 29, issue 1, 39-52

Abstract: In the crisis preceding the Gulf war, the United States favored pure coercion over carrot-and-stick offers. This article, which replicates and extends research reported by Leng (1984), supports the hypothesis that carrot-and-stick offers work better than pure coercion if an actor has already demonstrated resolve. Beginning with Jervis's (1976) distinction between deterrence and spiral theories of interaction, the article assesses the effects of various types of forceful moves in crisis bargaining. Interrupted time-series techniques are used with data on hostility levels in two confrontations to test the hypothesis that pure coercion tends to elicit a response in kind, whereas carrot-and-stick offers tend to elicit accommodation. Analysis of Behavioral Correlates of War data on actors' responses in the Cuban missile crisis and in the Egyptian-Israeli confrontation in 1967 corroborate Leng's original findings. Iraq's responses to the USA's threats in the Gulf conflict suggest that pure coercion can induce an opponent to fight even when it is weaker.

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:joupea:v:29:y:1992:i:1:p:39-52

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