 The Nuclear Arms Race: Prisoner's Dilemma or Perceptual Dilemma?S. Plous
Journal of Peace Research, 1993, vol. 30, issue 2, 163-179 Abstract: Traditionally, the most common game-theoretic model of the Soviet-US nuclear arms race has been an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. According to such a model, on any given trial both superpowers are better off arming regardless of what the other side chooses, but if both sides arm the outcome is less desirable than had both sides reduced their supply of weapons. Although Soviet and US preferences resembled a Prisoner's Dilemma throughout much of the Cold War, recent evidence suggests that the arms race is now more accurately modeled by a `Perceptual Dilemma'. In a Perceptual Dilemma, both sides: (1) prefer mutual arms reductions to all other outcomes; (2) want above all to avoid disarming while the other side arms; and (3) perceive the other side as preferring unilateral armament to all other outcomes. This article presents empirical evidence that the nuclear arms race is more appropriately modeled by a Perceptual Dilemma than by a Prisoner's Dilemma, including new survey data in which members of the Australian Parliament and the Israeli Knesset were asked to estimate the preferences of Soviet and US leaders. The paper concludes by reviewing several factors which sustain misperception and by suggesting that a Perceptual Dilemma can be solved with a clear, time-limited series of disarmament initiatives. Date: 1993 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:joupea:v:30:y:1993:i:2:p:163-179 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Journal of Peace Research from Peace Research Institute Oslo |
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