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Strength of Weakness: American-Indonesian Hegemonic Bargaining

Timo Kivimã„ki
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Timo Kivimã„ki: University of Helsinki, Department of Political Science

Journal of Peace Research, 1993, vol. 30, issue 4, 391-408

Abstract: The ability of some weak nations to outmanoeuvre superpowers in international negotiations has aroused the interest of many students of international relations. Several models have indicated how small and relatively weak powers such as Finland or Sweden can exercise power and avoid being crushed by the bigger powers. Traditionally, these explanations have been based on differences in the types of power, in the types of issues and in the kinds of interests involved in power relationships. The roles of the `defensive power' of the weak and the influence of the vitality of the issue and intensity of interests involved in power relationships have been stressed. The question of how weak and poor nations can resist disadvantageous superpower influences has been seen as a central issue of peace research: power relations of exploitation are rightfully seen as forms of violence in international politics. This article aims at contributing to the study of power relations between weak and strong nations by offering slightly different perspectives to the analysis. Here a conceptual distinction is made between `power' and `bargaining power'. Superpowers and great powers are expected to have power, while weaker powers can apply strategies to gain bargaining power. Second, this article draws some general conclusions on the basis of successful strategies used by a developing country, Indonesia, rather than the experiences of Finland or Sweden. Third, models of hegemonic order are employed to explain the bargaining power of weak and powerless countries.

Date: 1993
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