Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy

Peter C. Sederberg
Additional contact information
Peter C. Sederberg: Department of Government and International Studies, University of South Carolina

Journal of Peace Research, 1995, vol. 32, issue 3, 295-312

Abstract: Conventional wisdom suggests that regimes should never bargain with terrorists. This preference for coercive and repressive responses rests largely on rhetorical rather than analytical characterizations of the problem of terrorism. If we consider terrorism as one possible tactic available to a challenger group engaged in a political struggle we push the question of response back into the political context where it belongs. We argue that two major models of this political context - the war model and the rational actor model - not only fail to preclude conciliatory strategies, they actually incorporate them. We outline some of the strategic and tactical considerations that must be weighed in determining the appropriateness of a conciliatory strategy.

Date: 1995
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/32/3/295.abstract (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:joupea:v:32:y:1995:i:3:p:295-312

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Peace Research from Peace Research Institute Oslo
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().