Defensive Arms and the Security Dilemma: A Cybernetic Approach

Ian Bellany
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Ian Bellany: Department of Politics and International Relations, Lancaster University

Journal of Peace Research, 1996, vol. 33, issue 3, 263-271

Abstract: A cybernetic approach is taken to the operation of the security dilemma under conditions favourable to its resolution when states have defensive intentions and access only to defensive weaponry. A systems model of this situation indicates that when only two parties are involved, the security dilemma is resolvable - the system attains a stable peacetime equilibrium - even when some of the above constraints are relaxed. But when more than two parties are involved, the preconditions for a stable equilibrium and resolution of the security dilemma become very much more demanding. The enquiry throws light on a diversity of contemporary issues, including the emerging multipolar international order, nuclear non-proliferation and non-offensive defence.

Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:joupea:v:33:y:1996:i:3:p:263-271

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