Deliberation, Leverage or Coercion?

Paul J. Nelson
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Paul J. Nelson: Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland-College Park

Journal of Peace Research, 1997, vol. 34, issue 4, 467-470

Abstract: NGOs' influence over environmental policy in World Bank lending has involved successful application of international leverage to win compliance by borrowing governments. Decision-making at the World Bank on controversial environmental policy issues shows little evidence of growing consensus, communicative competence or widely shared values among the Bank's donor and borrower countries. Neither the World Bank's structure and mandate nor the NGO's strategies encourage such a consensus-based process. NGO environmental advocacy has instead tended to broaden the World Bank's authority to regulate its borrowers' economic and environmental policies.

Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:joupea:v:34:y:1997:i:4:p:467-470

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