A theory of social programs, legitimacy, and citizen cooperation with the state

Abraham Aldama
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Abraham Aldama: Center for Social Norms and Behavioral Dynamics, University of Pennsylvania

Journal of Peace Research, 2022, vol. 59, issue 4, 495-507

Abstract: Aid and social programs are commonly used to fight insurgencies. However, sometimes they fail to achieve their goal of increasing citizen cooperation with the state. I propose a series of game-theoretic models that focus on the strategic interaction between a state and a citizen in the face of a challenge to the state’s monopoly of power by an insurgency. I argue that even if the provision of aid or social programs increases citizens’ intrinsic motivation to cooperate with the state, it does not necessarily translate into more cooperation. I show that citizen cooperation depends on whether the increase in the provision of aid is accompanied by an increase in the use of violent or hard tools by the state, the citizens’ expectation of future rewards, and the insurgency’s response. The models thus provide a rationale for why even if social programs increase state legitimacy, they may fail to increase citizen cooperation.

Keywords: aid; game theory; hearts and minds; insurgency; legitimacy; state (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:joupea:v:59:y:2022:i:4:p:495-507

DOI: 10.1177/00223433211042792

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