Microfoundations of domestic audience costs in nondemocratic regimes: Experimental evidence from Putin’s Russia

Michal Smetana
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Michal Smetana: Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University

Journal of Peace Research, 2025, vol. 62, issue 2, 278-294

Abstract: Do leaders in nondemocratic regimes face public backlash when they threaten to use military force and back down? Whether citizens disapprove of empty threats is central to studying the domestic ‘audience costs’ in international crisis bargaining, but there is little experimental evidence of this phenomenon from autocracies. In this research article, I present the results of an original survey experiment investigating the microfoundations of domestic audience costs in the Russian Federation. My findings showed that even in Putin’s Russia, the citizens expressed attitudes in line with the audience costs theory. However, I also demonstrate that the effect of audience costs treatments was significantly stronger for the opponents of the current Russian leadership than for the supporters. The results of this study represent an important contribution to the existing literature by providing micro-level empirical evidence from a personalist nondemocratic regime.

Keywords: audience costs; autocracy; public opinion; Russia; survey experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:joupea:v:62:y:2025:i:2:p:278-294

DOI: 10.1177/00223433231220252

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