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Sending the B team: The impact of lesser signals of resolve

Roseanne W McManus and Tuba Sendinç
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Roseanne W McManus: Political Science Department, Pennsylvania State University
Tuba Sendinç: Political Science Department, Pennsylvania State University

Journal of Peace Research, 2025, vol. 62, issue 3, 580-594

Abstract: When signaling resolve, is it necessary to go ‘all-in’ and send the strongest possible signal or can sending a lesser signal be effective? Prior research suggests that sending a lesser signal is an admission of irresolution, akin to sending no signal. We make the novel claim that lesser signals of resolve can actually be worse for credibility than sending no signal, particularly in general deterrence situations. We theorize that while the absence of a signal may go unnoticed, a lesser signal puts a spotlight on irresolution. Building on prior findings that high-level visits can function as signals of extended deterrence commitment, we test our theory using new data on visits abroad by the US president, vice president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense. We find that only presidential visits are effective at deterring military challenges against the country visited. Visits by lesser officials, whom we dub the ‘B Team’, actually increase the risk of deterrence failure.

Keywords: credibility; deterrence; diplomatic visits; extended deterrence; signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:joupea:v:62:y:2025:i:3:p:580-594

DOI: 10.1177/00223433241243194

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