Setting targets: Abatement cost, vulnerability, and the agreement of NATO’s Wales Pledge on Defense Investment
Jordan Becker,
Paul Poast and
Tim Haesebrouck
Additional contact information
Jordan Becker: United States Military Academy, West Point, USA
Paul Poast: University of Chicago, USA
Tim Haesebrouck: Ghent University, Belgium
Journal of Peace Research, 2025, vol. 62, issue 4, 863-881
Abstract:
Why do countries mutually agree to constraints on their behavior? Why do they comply with such constraints in the absence of enforcement mechanisms? More specifically, why did NATO allies, with disparate geography and perceptions of the international security environment, agree to ‘aim to move towards’ increased defense spending (2% of GDP on defense and 20% of defense budgets on equipment modernization) at their 2014 Wales Summit? Moreover, why have they largely complied with this agreement subsequently? We argue that the ‘Interest Based’ framework for understanding the success or failure of environmental agreements is useful for understanding the agreement and implementation of the Wales Pledge. This argument finds support from interviews with participants and a purpose-built dataset including outcomes of interest (overall defense spending and share of defense budgets allocated to equipment modernization) and key independent variables (vulnerability to security threats and ‘abatement cost’ of meeting the Wales Pledge aims). We find that vulnerability and abatement costs affected both the order in which states agreed the pledge, and the extent to which they have complied with it.
Keywords: defense economics; international agreements; international organizations; international security; mixed methods; NATO; political economy of security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00223433241267798 (text/html)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:joupea:v:62:y:2025:i:4:p:863-881
DOI: 10.1177/00223433241267798
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Journal of Peace Research from Peace Research Institute Oslo
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().