Does Political Party Matter? Evidence from Close Races for Mais Médicos para o Brasil

Rafael Alves de Albuquerque Tavares ()

No 2017_05, Working Papers, Department of Economics from University of São Paulo (FEA-USP)

Abstract: Does the federal government prioritize its local's allies on the provision of public resources? Using a regression discontinuity design in close elections and data of the Projeto Mais Médicos para o Brasil − an ongoing program from the Brazilian Ministry of Health that targets the provision of basic health services and the increase of the physicians per capita rate by transferring professionals to the Brazilian municipalities −, this paper assesses the impact of the political alignment between federal and local governments on the number of physicians transferred to municipalities and the municipalities' probability of participation. The results suggest that the current federal government does not prioritize same-party municipalities nor penalizes the ones governed by the opposition parties. Evidence also indicate poor targeting of the program and the existence of party alignment effect on municipal participation among municipalities governed by second term mayors.

Keywords: Political Economy; Fiscal Federalism; Intergovernmental Transfers; Regression Discontinuity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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