EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Wage inequality as a worker discipline device under full employment

Jaylson Silveira () and Gilberto Lima

No 2026_12, Working Papers, Department of Economics from University of São Paulo (FEA-USP)

Abstract: The persistence of wage inequality among observationally equivalent workers remains a salient feature of labor markets, even under full employment. Empirical evidence indicates that higher wages raise on-the-job effort and that persistent wage differentials partly reflect firms’ strategic wage-setting behavior. This paper extends the canonical efficiency wage framework by incorporating firm heterogeneity in wage-setting. In equilibrium, wage inequality functions as a worker discipline device under full employment. As the proportion of efficiency-wage firms rises, the efficiency-to-competitive wage ratio increases monotonically, while the wage Gini coefficient follows an inverted-U pattern, underscoring a nonlinear trade-off between effort incentives and wage dispersion.

Keywords: Heterogeneous wage-setting; efficiency wage; competitive wage; discipline device; full employment; wage inequality; wage Gini coefficient (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J30 J31 J41 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.repec.eae.fea.usp.br/documentos/Silveira_Lima_12WP.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spa:wpaper:2026wpecon12

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers, Department of Economics from University of São Paulo (FEA-USP) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Pedro Garcia Duarte ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).

 
Page updated 2026-05-19
Handle: RePEc:spa:wpaper:2026wpecon12