A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games

Dongshuang Hou (), Weibin Han (), Genjiu Xu () and Yifan Feng ()
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Dongshuang Hou: Northwestern Polytechnical University
Weibin Han: South China Normal University
Genjiu Xu: Northwestern Polytechnical University
Yifan Feng: Northwestern Polytechnical University

4OR, 2024, vol. 22, issue 1, No 2, 17-30

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we enrich the model of cooperative cost games by introducing the notion of selfishness levels for players. With this notion, we introduce a new value called the generalized CIS value. To reveal the fairness of the generalized CIS value, we characterize this value through three perspectives. The first one is to provide a procedural implementation for this value, and show that the outcome of this implementation process coincides with the generalized CIS value. Secondly, by applying the optimization theory, we show that the generalized CIS value may minimize the players’ complaints from the perspective of average complaint. Lastly, we approach the generalized CIS value axiomatically by using the efficiency property and the equal maximal complaint property.

Keywords: Cooperative cost game; Generalized CIS value; Selfishness level; Optimization; Axiomatization; 91A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10288-023-00538-4

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