Symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria: examples with continuous payoff functions

Shiran Rachmilevitch ()
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Shiran Rachmilevitch: University of Haifa

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2023, vol. 11, issue 1, No 4, 65-68

Abstract: Abstract I construct examples of symmetric 2-person games that have Nash equilibria, but no symmetric Nash equilibria (not even in mixed strategies). Such an example was first constructed by Fey (Games Econ Behav 75: 424–427, 2012). In his example, the actions set is compact and the payoff function is discontinuous. Here, by contrast, payoff functions are continuous, but the actions sets are not compact.

Keywords: Symmetry; Symmetric equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00238-y

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