Social Motives and Trust: Implications for Joint Gains in Negotiations
Shay S. Tzafrir (),
Rudolph Joseph Sanchez () and
Keren Tirosh-Unger
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Shay S. Tzafrir: University of Haifa
Rudolph Joseph Sanchez: California State University
Keren Tirosh-Unger: Israel Institute of Technology
Group Decision and Negotiation, 2012, vol. 21, issue 6, No 4, 839-862
Abstract:
Abstract This study examined the role of trust via contingency model in a multi-issue multi-party negotiation setting and how it relates to outcomes. Results of a laboratory experiment with 288 undergraduate students confirmed both a main effect of Social Value Orientations (SVO), such that cooperative negotiators achieved higher joint gains than pro-self negotiators, and a main effect of Motivational Orientations (MO), such that pro-social negotiators attained higher joint gains than egoistic-oriented negotiators. Furthermore, the predicted interaction effect between SVO and MO, such that negotiators with a pro-self SVO attained higher joint gains in a pro-social, in contrast to an egoistic MO, condition was confirmed. This effect was fully mediated by trust. The dimension of trust that explained the SVO and MO interaction was that of concern for fellow negotiators as rated by oneself, as well as by an objective third-party observer. Implications for the strategic use of social motives and trust on effective information exchange and negotiated outcomes are discussed.
Keywords: Trust; Negotiation; Social value orientation; Motivational orientation; Joint gains (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:grdene:v:21:y:2012:i:6:d:10.1007_s10726-011-9252-8
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-011-9252-8
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