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Conflict Evolution: Tracking the Middle East Conflict with Drama Theory

Jim Bryant ()
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Jim Bryant: Sheffield Hallam University

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2014, vol. 23, issue 6, No 3, 1263-1279

Abstract: Abstract The situation in the Middle East has developed through an episodic process in which the protagonists have periodically changed the ‘game’ that they are playing by inventing new options, seeking to eliminate the options available to others, or by raising or eliminating doubts in the minds of others about their intentions. Such conflict evolution is readily captured by the framework of drama theory which goes some way to explaining the pressures motivating such actions. This paper traces the recent development of relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians through a succession of drama theoretic models. The importance of taking note of interactions at several levels is highlighted: stalemate at one level may be dislodged by actions taken in others. It is concluded that any resolution of the confrontations in the Middle East is likely to require the active involvement of the international community but may be destabilised by pressure from internal factions within the key parties.

Keywords: Drama theory; Conflict transformation; Modelling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-011-9256-4

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