Zeuthen–Hicks Bargaining in Electronic Negotiations

Rudolf Vetschera ()
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Rudolf Vetschera: University of Vienna

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2019, vol. 28, issue 2, No 2, 255-274

Abstract: Abstract We apply the Zeuthen–Hicks bargaining model in an empirical study of electronic negotiations. Using a typology of bargaining steps based on that model, we study to what extent actual steps conform to the predictions of the model, and the effects of conformity with the model on bargaining outcomes. Results indicate that the model predicts bargaining steps only slightly better than chance, but that steps conforming to the model lead to outcomes that are closer to the efficient frontier, closer to the Nash bargaining solution, and provide higher utility to the party using such steps.

Keywords: Zeuthen–Hicks bargaining; Bargaining steps; Electronic negotiations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-018-9604-8

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