Combining the Borda Count with Approval and Disapproval Voting

José Luis García-Lapresta () and Miguel Martínez-Panero ()
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José Luis García-Lapresta: University of Valladolid
Miguel Martínez-Panero: University of Valladolid

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2025, vol. 34, issue 6, No 9, 1499-1525

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we extend preference-approval structures to a more general situation, where voters can sort the alternatives in three disjoint classes instead of two (for instance, acceptable, neutral and unacceptable). We propose a parameterized family of voting systems related to the Borda count, where positive (negative) individual scores are assigned to acceptable (unacceptable) alternatives in a decreasing way from best to worst, while neutral alternatives obtain null scores. We analyze the role of parameters and provide some properties that satisfy the proposed voting systems.

Keywords: Voting systems; Borda count; Approval voting; Preference-approval (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-025-09953-w

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