Maximax Apportionments

Gianfranco Gambarelli
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Gianfranco Gambarelli: University of Bergamo

Group Decision and Negotiation, 1999, vol. 8, issue 6, No 1, 461 pages

Abstract: Abstract The method of apportionment proposed in this paper reverses the approach of classical methods, where techniques for the assignment of electoral seats are developed, and then the fairness criteria which are met by this technique are established. In this paper, however, an order of priority of the criteria is first established and then a "customized" solution is developed for each individual case following the approaches of Balinski and Young. By using suitable relations of dominance between seat distributions and Cooperative Game Theory, it is possible to obtain a "minimax apportionment", i.e. a distribution which minimizes the gravest possible distorsions. This method can also be easily applied to multiordered apportionments.

Keywords: apportionments; voting; power indices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1008675107505

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